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A DEFENSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE “OFFICER”
SUCCESSION PROVISIONS
Seth Barrett Tillman*
I am going to try to reframe the issue very slightly. One way of looking at
the issue is: What were the Framers trying to fashion when they drafted the
Presidential Succession Clause?1 What were they hoping to achieve? Or,
another way of looking at the question is: What should any of us want to
achieve by a presidential succession regime?
It strikes me that a working presidential succession model has to have three
characteristics: it has to produce a timely result; it has to have a clearly
identifiable successor; and it has to be legally and recognizably valid, and in
the sense used here, constitutionally valid is part of that. What we have now2
is a statutory legislative officer succession regime, which was also part of
what was the (presumptive) original legislative officer succession statutory
regime.3 The chief alternative was what we had in the 1886 statute,4 and that
is Cabinet officer succession. I would like to compare the two models.
Does Cabinet officer succession meet the three goals I outlined before? I
would say the answer to that is “no.” Cabinet succession is a fixed list. If
the entire membership of that fixed list is decapitated by war, or a pandemic,
or otherwise, then you do not have a successor, and that is the end of the
whole ballgame. In such circumstances, you do not have anyone whose
succession is constitutionally and otherwise legally valid.
The problem cannot be corrected once it occurs. A fixed list requires a fix
or an amendment. That means a new statute. A statute requires a president
and that is the whole problem we have. Ex hypothesi, we do not have a
* Associate Professor, Maynooth University School of Law and Criminology, Ireland, Scoil
an Dlí agus na Coireolaíochta Ollscoil Mhá Nuad. I thank Dean Feerick, Professor Rogan,
and Roy E. Brownell II for extending an invitation to participate in this program. These
remarks were delivered as part of the program entitled The Presidential Succession Act at 75:
Praise It or Bury It?, which was held on April 6, 2022 and hosted by the Fordham University
School of Law. This transcript has been edited, primarily to conform with the Fordham Law
Review’s publication requirements, and it represents the speaker’s individual views alone.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office,
or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.” (emphasis added)).
2. Presidential Succession Act, 3 U.S.C. § 19.
3. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886).
4. Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
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president. Cabinet succession risks the end of the system, and it puts the
system beyond judicial resolution because there would not be a situation of
competing heirs with competing claims—there would be no heir at all.
What about legislative officer succession? Does it meet the three goals I
outlined before? The answer is, “yes,” it does. It is not fixed. It can be
expanded, not only expanded, but the list can be expanded without a statute
and without a president. There is always a House and Senate in being, and if
the presiding officer dies, then each of the two houses can just elect, by
simple majority, a new presiding officer, and that solves the problem. If the
entire membership were to be decapitated, then the Senate can be quickly
reconstituted by gubernatorial appointments,5 and the House can have speedy
ad hoc by-elections under well-established rules.6 Again, we could get a new
presiding officer immediately or in fairly quick order. There is always going
to be a legitimate heir with legislative officer succession, and if there is not
one on hand, one can be quickly arranged.
Under legislative officer succession, although there might be more than
one person with a claim on the presidency, such a claim is judicially
resolvable. As I have explained, that might not be true with Cabinet officer
succession. So the question has to be asked: Why do so many people in
academia, and why do so many policy wonks come out against legislative
officer succession? What is the reason? There are several. One is, and the
truth is, we have lots of armchair generals who are fighting the last war. They
imagine that the real risk to the system is the lone gunman, the lone bomber,
and the mortality tables striking down the president or other heir in a
succession crisis.
That is not where the real risk is, and that should be especially obvious,
given that we have just gone through a global pandemic. The real risk to the
system is not one that is so easily insurable against. Rather than looking to
party continuity as the test of a good succession order, we should be making
sure we have some successor at all, one that can be recognized by the wider
public and by the judiciary as being legitimate.
Neither system, in fact, can guarantee party stability. That is another
problem with this debate. The debate is always framed in regard to
legislative officer succession, in that there is a risk that a different party will
end up in control. But that is also the case for Cabinet officer succession. If
the president (and vice president) or president-elect (and vice president elect)
should die after the general election, anytime up until the inauguration, or
even after the inauguration, but prior to the new president’s appointing his
first Cabinet member, then you are going to have a change in party control,
because it will be a member of the outgoing Cabinet who would succeed
under Cabinet officer succession. That Cabinet member may be from the
5. See Filling Vacancies in the U.S. Senate, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Filling_vacancies_in_the_U.S._Senate [https://perma.cc/5WEF-DPT9] (last visited Nov. 3,
2022) (showing that, in thirty-seven states, vacancies in the Senate are temporarily filled by
gubernatorial appointment).
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
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administration that just lost at the polls, either at the general election or at the
primaries. If the argument is going to be pushed forward that we ought to
look at this second-tier benefit of party continuity, then there is no guarantee
you will get that with Cabinet officer succession anyway. As a matter of fact,
it simply makes no sense to point to party continuity as the only test of
whether the system is working.
The other benefit of legislative officer succession is one that Truman
pointed to.7 At a time of national crisis, where the elected president and vice
president are gone, we certainly want someone who carries real democratic
bona fides, and that would certainly include the Speaker of the House.8 It is
true we often elect people who are quite elderly to be the Senate president
pro tempore. That might very well change if we had real expectations that
the Senate president pro tempore was expected to succeed.
In a national crisis, it is important that we have people to look to—that we
have a successor. Now, the same is true for Cabinet succession. An
upper-tier Cabinet member might be a person who had high political office,
had been elected to other offices, and might very well be a good choice. But
given the realities of Cabinet officer succession, we might very well have
someone far down on the list succeed. Cabinet succession is no guarantee
that we are really going to have the right sort of person when we need them.
Let me summarize: between legislative officer succession and Cabinet
succession, we have a choice. Legislative officer succession is flexible, and
in effect, it is expandable in an emergency. The line of succession is future
oriented, and it could be governed and reestablished by simple single-house
votes. Cabinet succession by contrast is inflexible. It is a fixed line. It is
retrospectively oriented. It is governed by statutes, which in an emergency,
ex hypothesi, we do not have an opportunity to amend, because we will not
have a president on hand.
There are a few other reasons why legislative officer succession is opposed
by so many. I am just going to mention them in passing. One is that there
are people who simply do not believe that it is constitutional.9 This is really
a very surprising story. If one looks to the debates in 1792, on the first
Succession Act, one cannot easily find any record of anyone pointing to a
lack of constitutionality, except for maybe one Congressman.10 Certainly
James Madison did not squarely say that the 1792 succession statute’s using
legislative officer succession was unconstitutional. He merely wrote a

7. See Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presidency, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 128, 129–30 (June 19, 1945).
8. Id.
9. See generally, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Essay, Is the
Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995).
10. Seth Barrett Tillman, The 1792 Madison-to-Pendleton Letter: A Time for
Reconsideration, Reflection, and Response? 14–18 (Feb. 14, 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3531075 [https://perma.cc/KB6T-GQ4E] (reporting on comments by Congressman
Giles questioning the 1792 statute’s constitutionality).
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private letter where he said the statute “errs.”11 Many people have latched
onto that letter, and they have assumed Madison meant the statute was
unconstitutional,12 but Madison did not actually say that. He might have
simply meant that the choice was a poor one, it was an impolitic choice, or
that the policy result was bad or impractical. We do not know that Madison
thought it was unconstitutional.13 We certainly have no record of his saying
that on the House floor when he was a member. Likewise, we have no record
of his telling President George Washington not to sign the bill for that reason.
He was one of Washington’s advisors and confidantes, although he was not
in Washington’s Cabinet.
Another reason not to rely on Madison is in that very same letter he
indicated that he lacked confidence in the views he put forward. He merely
said the choice of Congress “may be questioned.”14 He did not flatly say he
thought it was unconstitutional.15 On the other side of the issue, in 1792, as
also in 1947, we have: (1) both a majority of the members of the House and
a majority of the members of the Senate (including any number of ratifiers
and any number of members of the Philadelphia Convention) who voted on
those bills in preliminary stages, and who voted to enact them into law on the
final vote, and (2) President George Washington who signed the statute into
law. That ought to count for something.
The argument against legislative officer succession also rests on the use of
the word “Officer,” which appears in the Presidential Succession Clause.16
It seems to be assumed by some that that word must mean executive
officers.17 The Constitution does not come with a glossary. The word
“Officer” is quite capacious and might very well include presiding legislative
officers. I think it does, and certainly the Second Congress and President
Washington thought it did. The idea that we have to wait for judicial
resolution before we could have confidence on this point is certainly a
practical argument against legislative officer succession, but it is not one that
is customarily made for other bills and for other similarly important acts.
There is one final reason legislative officer succession is opposed. It is
simply for this reason. We have a tradition in our legal culture that sees
Congress, as it was described in The Federalist Papers, as a “vortex,”18 as
something that is aggrandizing and dangerous, and therefore perhaps it is

11. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 21, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS
235, 235 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
12. See, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 116.
13. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
14. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 11, at 235.
15. See generally id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
17. See, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 114–18.
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 268 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“But
experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly over-rated; and that
some more adequate defence is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more
powerful, members of the government. The legislative department is every where extending
the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.” (emphasis added)).
OF JAMES MADISON
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dangerous to choose its presiding officers.19 I think that is just an ancient
prejudice, and it simply does not make sense to embrace this prejudice when
we have so many firm contrary precedents from the past, including from the
1792 Act. It is simply mistaken to rely on what really appears little more
than guesswork based upon Madison’s purported views expressed
exclusively in a private letter, to adopt the position that the word “officer”
standing alone cannot include legislative officers.
In any event, I would like to propose a partial solution that I think captures
the best of both worlds. Legislative officer succession, I think should be
maintained, but put at the bottom of the otherwise inflexible list of Cabinet
officers. It should be there as a backup. In addition, when Cabinet officers
succeed, they should not succeed or act as president past the term of the
president who appointed them. That is when their ability to succeed and to
maintain their office ought to time out. If that only leaves legislative officer
succession in those circumstances, then that is a positive and democratic
feature, not a bug.

19. For U.S. Supreme Court authority quoting Madison’s “vortex” language from The
Federalist No. 48, see Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212, 252 (2016) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 788 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 554–55 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.); id. at 614 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221–22 (1995) (Scalia, J.). There is much other judicial
authority from other federal courts and from state courts of record. See, e.g., Bush v. Schiavo,
885 So. 2d 321, 330 (Fla. 2004) (Pariente, C.J.) (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 221–22).

